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Responding to “populist” 
politics at EU level: Regulation 
1141/2014 and beyond
John Morijn*
This article presents and analyzes the EU values compliance mechanism as set up in 
Regulation 1141/2014, and amended by Regulation 2018/673, on the statute and funding 
of  European political parties and European political foundations. It assesses to what extent 
this Regulation, that has been perceived and presented as targeting “populists,” provides a 
comprehensive response to illiberal politics at EU level, and what lessons can be drawn from its 
origin for the application of  other values compliance based instruments such as Article 7 TEU. 
For that purpose it tracks the Regulation’s drafting history in considerable detail and critically 
assesses the outcome. It concludes that the Regulation offers a limited and limiting framework 
to act against illiberal political forces within the European Parliament, because it is unlikely 
to work in disciplining mainstream political groups and parties that harbor illiberal elements 
associated with Article 2 TEU-related problems in various member states. At the same time, 
the article identifies elements of  the mechanism that provide opportunities to help shape a 
more effective EU response to rule of  law backsliding across Europe.
1. Introduction
In recent years there has been intense European Union (EU)-level debate and activity in an 
effort to address illiberalism and rule of  law backsliding across Europe. The main focal point 
has been the procedure laid down in Article 7 of  the Treaty on European Union (Article 7 
TEU). That article lays down a procedure for EU-level action in case a member state’s actions 
contravene the “EU values” laid down in Article 2 TEU. That article articulates the very legal 
and political foundations upon which EU cooperation is to take place. It reads as follows:
The Union is founded on the values of  respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equal-
ity, the rule of  law and respect for human rights, including the rights of  persons belonging 
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to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which plural-
ism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men 
prevail.1
Even if  it is not that long ago that EU-wide stable compliance was thought of  as a mat-
ter of  course, times have changed quickly. The European Commission (Commission) 
has had to launch an Article 7 TEU procedure against Poland.2 The European 
Parliament (Parliament) also called on the Council to trigger the same procedure re-
garding Hungary.3 The Parliament also adopted further resolutions reacting to spe-
cific rule of  law backsliding developments in other member states4 and called on the 
Commission to propose a mechanism to monitor the rule of  law in all member states 
periodically.5 These activities have in common that they attempt to generate EU-level 
pressure to secure member state-level compliance with Article 2 TEU. All of  them have 
benefited from considerable scholarly discussion.6
What has drawn less attention is that another Article 2 TEU compliance mech anism, 
focused on the EU level instead of  the member state level was beefed up as well. Regulation 
1141/2014 (Regulation) on the statute and funding of  European political parties and 
European political foundations (Regulation),7 recently further amended by Regulation 
2018/673,8 reconfirmed that European political parties (EuPP, Europarties)9 and 
1 For an analysis of  this provision, including whether and to what extent the principles listed in Article 2, 
second sentence, have a different status from those in the first sentence, cf. Markus Klamert & Dimitry 
Kochenov, Article 2 TEU, in The eU TreaTies and The CharTer of fUndamenTal righTs 15–16 (point 5) (Manuel 
Kellerbauer, Marcus Klamert, & Jonathan Tomkin eds., 2019). For a convincing argument that “values” 
are not just vague aspirations but (binding) fundamental principles of  Union law, see Dimitry Kochenov, 
The Acquis and Its Principles—The Enforcement of  the “Law” versus the Enforcement of  “Values” in the EU, in 
enforCemenT of eU law and ValUes 1, 1 (Dimitry Kochenov & Andras Jakab eds., 2017).
2 European Commission, Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) of  the TEU regarding the Rule 
of  Law in Poland, COM(2017) 835, December 20, 2017.
3 European Parliament, Resolution of  September 12, 2018, A8-0250/2018, on a proposal calling on the 
Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) TEU, the existence of  a clear risk of  a serious breach by 
Hungary of  the values on which the Union is founded.
4 For some recent examples, see European Parliament Resolution of  November 15, 2017, 2017/2935 
(RSP), on the rule of  law in Malta; European Parliament Resolution of  April 19, 2018 (2018/2628(RSP), 
on protection of  investigative journalists in Europe: the case of  Slovak journalist Ján Kuciak and Martina 
Kušnírová); European Parliament Resolution of  November 13, 2018, 2018/2844(RSP), on the rule of  
law in Romania; European Parliament Resolution of  December 13, 2018, 2018/2975(RSP), on conflicts 
of  interest and the protection of  the EU budget in the Czech Republic.
5 European Parliament Resolution of  October 25, 2016, A8-0283/2016, with recommendations to the 
Commission on the establishment of  an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of  law, and fundamental rights.
6 Laurent Pech & Kim Lane Scheppele, Illiberalism Within: Rule of  Law Backsliding in the EU, 19 Cambridge 
Y.b. eUr. sTUd. 3 (2017); Jan-Werner Müller, Should the EU Protect Democracy and the Rule of  Law Inside 
Member States?, 21 eUr. l.J. 141 (2015); R. Daniel Kelemen, Europe’s Other Democratic Deficit: National 
Authoritarianism in Europe’s Democratic Union, 52 goV’T & opposiTion 211 (2017); John Morijn, Post-Lisbon 
Civil Rights Protection by the EU’s Political Institutions, in CiVil righTs and eU CiTizenship 14 (Sybe de Vries, 
Henri de Waele, & Marie-Pierre Granger eds., 2018).
7 Regulation 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of  European Political Parties and European Political 
Foundations, OJ EU L 317/1, November 4, 2014.
8 Regulation (EU, Euratom), 2018/673, amending Regulation 1141/2014, OJ EU L 114 I/1, May 4, 2018.
9 “A European political party is a [structured cooperation between political parties and/or citizens] which 
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European political foundations (EPF, Foundations)10 can only receive EU funding if, and 
as long as, they respect Article 2 TEU. The Regulation considerably strengthened com-
pliance verification possibilities for this existing obligation by setting up the independent 
Authority for Political Parties and Foundations (APPF, Authority) to register, monitor, 
and sanction EuPP and EPF, and a Committee of  Independent Eminent Persons (CoIEP, 
Committee) to help it with research about EU values compliance.
This Regulation, first proposed in 2001, was sensitive from the outset. It was per-
ceived by (right-wing) “populists” as specifically targeting them. Member states with 
governments nationally led by or reliant on the support of  extreme right-wing parties 
initially blocked it in the EU institution they gather in, the Council of  Ministers, and were 
subsequently outvoted.11 Elsewhere, after failing to block it in the Parliament, several 
groups of  right-wing populists unsuccessfully challenged its legality.12 The Regulation’s 
more recent reform in 2017, making it impossible for different members of  European 
Parliament representing one national party to support more than one EuPP at a time,13 
was called for and supported by “mainstream” parties to target practices of  right-wing 
populists14 (who often supported more than one Europarty).15 The Commission, taking 
up this request, also framed the effort as such.16 In that light it is hardly surprising that 
negotiations about beefing up values verification between 2012 and 2014—the focus 
of  this article—were protracted. In fact, they were two discussions wrapped into one.
First there was the new mechanism itself. The concern was how and by whom 
EU-level verification should be undertaken for it to be credible yet politically balanced 
and effective. An underlying second concern, given the close connection between 
member state and EU-level political parties, was how any solution would spill over 
into other EU activities focusing on guaranteeing Article 2 TEU compliance directed at 
the member state level, primarily Article 7 TEU. The compliance mechanism’s drafting 
history and final set-up therefore tell a story not only about how the response to illib-
eral politics was sharpened at EU level below the radar. It also constitutes a rare and 
10 “A European political foundation is an entity formally affiliated with a [EuPP] which through its activies 
underpins and complements the [EuPP] objectives by performing [tasks such as]: (a) observing, analys-
ing and contributing to the debate on European public policy issues . . .; (b) developing activities linked to 
European public policy issues . . .; (c) developing cooperation in order to promote democracy . . .; and (d) 
serving as a framework for national political foundations, academics, and other relevant actors to work 
together at European level. Article 3(4).
11 Simon Lightfoot, The Consolidation of  Europarties? The “Party Regulation” and the Development of  Political 
Parties in the European Union, 42 represenTaTion 303, 307 (2006).
12 See Section 3.
13 Article 3(1)(ba)—adapted by Regulation 2018/673.
14 European Parliament Resolution of  June 15, 2017, 2017/2733(RSP), on the funding of  political parties 
and political foundations at European level. The detailed voting record can be found at https://www.
votewatch.eu/.
15 For a good analysis of  the rules in force before these changes, see Wouter Wolfs, EU Party Funding: A Pro-
European Instrument to Support Euroscepticism?, 2017 oeCd global anTi-CorrUpTion & inTegriTY forUm 
(2017).
16 In his 2017 State of  the Union address the Commission President stated: “Today the Commission is 
proposing new rules on [EuPP/EPF] financing. . . . We should not be filling the coffers of  anti-Euro-
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detailed on-the-record account of  a legislative discussion about normative and institu-
tional questions relating to Article 2 TEU compliance verification.
This article presents and analyzes the Regulation’s EU values compliance mech-
anism. It assesses the nature and usability of  each of  its elements, and investigates 
what lessons it could teach about safeguarding Article 2 TEU generally. It shows that 
the Regulation’s values compliance mechanism offers a problematically limited and 
limiting framework to act against parliamentary illiberal actors. As a matter of  law 
and inter-institutional setting the mechanism appears tailored to single out only a 
subset of  problematic illiberals, namely those united in a single European political 
party. Crucially, those illiberal elements that the EU has so far attempted to target are 
part of  other Europarties. It is assessed whether and how this evident shortcoming 
could be corrected. In addition, the article identifies the Regulation’s further elements 
which, if  acted upon properly and in combination with Article 2 TEU compliance 
instruments focused on the member state-level such as Article 7 TEU, may provide 
previously unexplored opportunities to help safeguard the rule of law.
The analysis begins by providing normative and factual context about the relation 
between (different forms of) “populism” and Article 2 TEU, and where those character-
ized as “populists” sit in Parliament (Section 2). It then tracks in detail the Regulation’s 
drafting history, from when it was first discussed in 2001 to its four consecutive ver-
sions of  2003, 2007, 2017, and 2018 (Section 3). The article next analyzes the 
resulting regulatory solution. It identifies issues to be interpreted with a view to opera-
tionalizing the Regulation’s values verification mechanism vis-à-vis populism-associ-
ated illiberalism and signals how this could inform, and work in tandem with, other 
such EU instruments (Section 4). Finally, Section 5 presents a brief  conclusion.
2. Normative and factual context
As was pointed out earlier and will be elaborated more fully below, linking EU funding for 
EuPP and EPF to registration requirements and adherence to EU basis values was initially 
perceived and more recently more openly presented as targeting some forms of  “popu-
list” politics at the EU level. Populism, however, is a nebulous term.17 It is not defined as 
a matter of  Union law. Rather, what is seen as problematic about it needs to be inferred 
from the Union law and regulatory practice. It is nonetheless instrumental to start the anal-
ysis by clarifying in what forms and with what substantive focus politics often described 
17 Often three different ways of  viewing “us versus them” politics are distinguished: a view of  politics (pop-
ulism as a way of  defining democratic politics generally as a necessesarily permanent struggle between 
two opposing camps with views that cannot be reconciled), a political strategy (populism as a polarizing 
“underbelly”-style to achieve political aims), or an additional ideology (populism attaching to any other sub-
stantial political agenda as a “thin” (i.e. substantively empty) ideology relying on certain beliefs about the 
relative importance of  the view of  the people); cf. CrisTobal roVira KalTwasser eT al., eds., The oxford handbooK 
of popUlism (2018). The latter, “ideational” approach, is seen as dominant. It argues that populism “should 
be defined as a set of  ideas that not only depicts society and divided between ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the 
corrupt elite,’ but also claims that politics is about respecting popular sovereignty at any cost.” Cf. Cas Mudde 
& Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, 51 Comp. pol. sTUd. 1, 4 (2018). For a discussion of  limitations of  using these 
definitions of  populism in the context of  assessing challenges to liberal democracy, see John Morijn, Review of  
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as “populist” occurs in Europe, and how that links to the primary Union law of  Article 2 
TEU (Section 2.1). Section 2.2 will then clarify where “populist” political actors sit in the 
Parliament.
2.1. Normative context
In mapping “populist” parties in the EU member states, well-known populism scholar 
Mudde18 has included such varied actors as Hungarian Fidesz and Jobbik, Polish PiS, 
The Finns, Danish People’s Party, Greek Syriza, Spanish Podemos, German Alternative 
für Deutschland (AfD), Italian Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) and Lega, French Front 
National (now: Rassemblement National), Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), Austrian 
FPÖ, Slovak Smer-Direction, UK Independence Party, and Belgian Flemish Interest. 
Also right-wing extremists such as the Greek Golden Dawn could be added. Based on 
the previously described rule of  law resolutions of  the European Parliament, and the 
situations described therein, some would also include the Maltese Labour Party, the 
Romanian Social Democrats, and Czech ANO as parties deserving of  scrutiny based 
on Article 2 TEU. But what do all these parties have in common, where are they dis-
tinct, and how could this be assessed as a matter of  (Union) law?
In a report about populism, the Council of  Europe recently distinguished a num-
ber of  general features, including pressures to dismantle checks and balances, under-
mining human rights and challenging international checks on unrestrained state 
power.19 Brubaker provides a useful schematic distinction between substantive pop-
ulisms in Northern and Western European (NWE), Central and Eastern European 
(CEE), and Southern European (SE).20 NWE populism draws a contrast not in national 
but in broader civilizational terms (a threat from Islam). It embraces Christianity not 
as a religion but as a culture, and secularism to minimize the visibility of  Islam in the 
public sphere. Paradoxically, some human rights (particularly free speech and gender 
issues) are selectively championed to contrast with Islamic illiberalism.21 CEE popu-
lism does view Christianity as a religion, leading to a defense of  family values and a 
rejection of  secularism and human rights as externally imposed. SE populism is prin-
cipally concerned with the implications of  economic austerity and corrupt political 
elites. Of  course, there are many instances in which these types occur in mixed ways 
or cooperate, exemplified by the cooperation between M5S and Lega in Italy.
In combination, this roughest of  characterizations allows us to show how these 
varied political agendas have both overlapping and distinctive features. It facilitates a 
basic sketch of  how each relates to what is binding (and therefore actionable) as a mat-
ter of  Union law, Article 2 TEU. “Populist” actions may lead to a different spread of  ten-
sions with different EU values. More specifically, all sustained illiberal action typically 
involves an attempt at limiting debate, delegitimizng dissent, and reducing political 
18 Cas Mudde, Populism in Europe: A Primer, open demoCraCY (May 12, 2015), https://www.opendemocracy.
net/can-europe-make-it/cas-mudde/populism-in-europe-primer.
19 Council of  Europe, Populism—How Strong Are Europe’s Checks and Balances?, ann. rep. 6 (2017).
20 Rogers Brubaker, Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Moment in Comparative 
Perspective, 40 eThniC & raCial sTUd. 1191 (2017).
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pluralism. Free media, civil society, the judiciary, and parliamentary authority are all 
targeted and systematically discredited22 as part and parcel of  the “elite.” From the 
viewpoint of  Article 2 TEU, it is clear that the values of  pluralism, non-discrimination, 
and democracy are at stake if  the voice and interests of  those not considered part of  
“the people” are systematically excluded. The EU values of  freedom, the rule of  law, 
justice, and political rights such as freedom of  speech are put in jeopardy by purely 
partisan appointments of  judges, or when NGOs are undermined. In this sense any 
illiberal action strikes at the EU’s normative foundations.
Depending on the substantive agenda, however, quite different Article 2 TEU values 
are triggered. NWE right-wing xenophobic extremism stands in tension with toler-
ance, minority rights, and freedom of  religion (particularly for European Muslims). 
CEE traditionalist nationalism is likely to come into tension with non-discrimination, 
gender equality, and LGBTI rights specifically. The SE populist focus on implications of  
dominant economic policy (including the EU’s role) concerns principally the Article 2 
TEU value of  solidarity—and perhaps actually a call to give it substance.
2.2. Factual context
How do said populist parties, and the Article 2 TEU tensions their actions potentially 
entail, translate into the European Parliament (EP)? As shown above Europarties are a 
cooperation between national political parties from a particular famille spirituelle.23 The 
membership must originate from at least one-quarter of  the member states.24 In order to 
receive EU funding, at least one Europarty-member should hold a seat in the European 
Parliament.25 Elected members of  the European Parliament also organize themselves into 
distinct entities: political groups, the Parliament’s power blocks. The European Parliament 
rules of  procedure state that twenty-five members of  the European Parliament with sim-
ilar political affinities, originating from at least one-quarter of  the member states, can 
form one.26 The obvious benefits of  an established political group revolve around both 
money and power: they are funded through a distinct budget line and gain speaking time 
during debates, chair meetings and parliamentary committees, and are able to draft and 
amend reports and opinions coming out of  such European parliamentary committees.
Europarties and political groups are therefore distinct but linked. Members of  the 
European Parliament who are members of  European political parties are components 
of  the Parliament’s political groups. Most of  these political groups consist of  more than 
one Europarty. It is not uncommon that Members of  the European Parliament either 
change political groups during the five-year term or are asked to leave a political group. 
Moreover, some political groups contain (all or just a number of  individual Members of  
the European Parliament associated to specific) national political parties or independent 
politicians not part of  a Europarty (i.e. unaffiliated). On the other hand, some Members 
22 Council of  Europe, supra note 19, 6.
23 Lightfoot, supra note 11, at 304.
24 Art. 3(1)(b).
25 Art. 17(1).
26 EP Rules of  Procedure, rules 32(1) and 32(2). At the time of  introduction these establishment criteria 
were unsuccessfully challenged by the French Front National as exclusionary; C-486/01, Front National/
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Table 1. Groups, parties and foundations
POLITICAL GROUP AFFILIATED EuPP AFFILIATED EPF
Group of  the European People’s Party 
(Christian Democrats)
European People’s Party Wilfried Martens Centre for 
European Democracy
Group of  the Progressive Alliance of  
Socialists and Democrats (S&D)
Party of  European 
Socialists
Foundation for European 
Progressive Studies
Group of  the Alliance of  Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe (ALDE)
Alliance of  Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe 
Party
European Liberal Forum
 European Democratic 
Party
Institute for European 
Democrats
 Europeans United for 
Democracy
Organization for European 
Interstate Cooperation
Group of  the Greens/European Free 
Alliance (Greens—EFA)
European Green Party Green European Foundation
 European Free Alliance Coppieters Foundation






Foundation for European 
Reform
 European Free Alliance Coppieters Foundation
 European Christian 
Political Movement
Sallux
Confederal Group of  the European 
United Left–Nordic Green Left 
(GUE-NGL)
Party of  the European 
Left
Transform Europe
 Europeans United for 
Democracy
Organization for European 
Interstate Cooperation
Europe of  Nations and Freedom (ENF) Movement for a Europe 
of  Nations and 
Freedom (MENL)
Foundation for a Europe of  
Nations and Freedom
 European Alliance for 
Freedom (EAF)
European Foundation for 
Freedom (EFF)
Europe of  Freedom and Direct 
Democracy Group (EFDD)
Alliance for Direct 
Democracy in Europe 
(ADDE)
Institute for Direct Democracy 
in Europe (IDDE)
 Movement for a Europe 
of  Liberties and 
Democracy (MELD)
Foundation for a Europe of  
Liberties and Democracy 
(FELD)
Non-alligned (NA) Alliance of  European 
National Movements 
(AENM)
European identity and 
traditions
 Alliance for Peace and 
Freedom (APF)
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of  the European Parliament linked to a specific European political party may not be able 
to join or form a political group and remain non-aligned, effectively barring them from 
any meaningful political impact as part of  the European Parliament. Yet their Europarty 
can continue to be funded. In short, it requires trained eyes even for those who consider 
themselves specialists of  EU politics to assess the ever-changing situation. Table 1 is an 
overview of  a map of  EuPP and EPF that have been active over past years.27
Where do “populists” enter this picture? Hungarian Fidesz is part of  the Europarty called 
European People’s Party, which forms the political group of  the same name. Slovak Smer-
Direction belongs to the Party of  European Socialists Europarty and the political group of  
the same name, along with the Romanian Social Democratic Party and the Maltese Labour 
Party. Czech ANO is part of  the Europarty called Alliance for Liberals and Democrats in 
Europe, which is one of  several Europarties making up a political group of  the same name. 
The UK Conservatives, Polish Law and Justice (PiS), and The Finns are part of  a Europarty 
by the name of  the Alliance of  Conservatives and Reformists in Europe, which along with 
two other Europarties forms the European and Conservatives and Reformists political 
group. The Danish People’s Party (which is unaffiliated) belongs to this political group too. 
Greek Syriza is a member of  the Europarty by the name of  Party of  the European Left. This 
is one of  the components of  the Confederal Group of  the United Left–Nordic Green Left 
political group, to which unaffiliated Spanish Podemos belong as well.
The situation on the (far) right side is as complex. UKIP was the lead member of  
the Alliance for Direct Democracy (ADDE) Europarty. The accompanying Europe of  
Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFFD) political group also contains Italian M5S and 
(one part of  the) German AfD. Belgian Flemish Interest, Italian Lega Nord, French Front 
National (now: Rassemblement National), and Austrian FPÖ belong to the Movement 
for a Europe of  Nations and Freedom (MENL) Europarty. Together with the Dutch PVV 
and the (remainder of) German AfD, which are both unaffiliated, they belong to the 
Europe of  Nations and Freedom (ENL) political group. Finally, a number of  Members 
of  the European Parliament coming from extreme right populist parties such as Greek 
Golden Dawn and Hungarian Jobbik were part of  the Europarty by the name of  Alliance 
for Peace and Freedom (APF), but non-aligned. Hence it is evident—and this is a cen-
tral insight—that those considered “populists” nationally are surprisingly spread out 
over EuPP and political groups, including, crucially, over “mainstream” ones.
3. Regulation 1141/2014 and the birth of  its EU values 
compliance mechanism
Against this background we can describe why and how the EU legislator worked on 
linking funding for European political parties and European political foundations to 
compliance with Article 2 TEU values. It is worthwhile to do this in detail. Not only 
27 Section 4 will explain how and why some EuPP and EPF recently failed to register or were deregistered, 
resulting in a discontinuation of  their funding. The political groups continued to exist.
28 All documents are publicly available from the EU institutions’ websites or other repositories. One helpful 
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does this illustrate the convoluted and protracted trajectory of  the Regulation’s birth28 
and why this legislation was perceived early on to target “populists,” but, more im-
portantly, it shows that many elements eventually included in the mechanism had 
already been considered in one form or another, long before EU enlargement or di-
rect linkage to Article 7 TEU, or any sign that that provision could one day be used. 
A longer view ensures a better analysis of  the result and its likely usability. It also helps 
to contextualize oft-recurring calls for ever more additional procedures and actors.
The first proposal to regulate EuPP was tabled in February 2001.29 The idea originated 
in a technical Court of  Auditors’ demand for a proper legal basis enabling direct financ-
ing of  Europarties instead of  via the political groups’ budget line.30 The Commission 
inserted substantive conditioning. It provided for a Europarty to be allowed to register 
if  “its programme and its activities . . . respect the fundamental principles of  democracy, 
respect for fundamental rights and . . . the rule of  law.” Its justification was as follows31: 
“a European political party must be attached to [these principles] . . . it would not be 
acceptable for a party that preaches restrictions on rights, intolerance or xenophobia, 
whether it is for or against European integration, to enjoy public financial support.”
The European Parliament in its report took this at face value, summarizing it sim-
ply as a requirement to “provide evidence of  the democractic structure of  a party.”32 
It also tabled an amendment aimed at clarifying that in case a Europarty acted con-
trary to fundamental principles it was to be suspended at the Commission’s request, 
after consultation with the European Parliament and the Council of  Ministers.33 As to 
monitoring, the Commission initially proposed that a “committee of  wise men” check 
compliance with all EuPP registration conditions.34 At the Parliament’s instigation, 
however—which argued that “the establishment of  such a body should be considered 
only in exceptional cases, the European Parliament itself  [being] in a position to assess 
compliance”35—this element was removed. The task was handed to the European 
Parliament Bureau.36 The Commission accepted this.37
The revised proposal did not fly in the (pre EU-enlargement) Council of  Ministers 
where—given the then Article 251 TEC (later Article 308 TEC, now Article 352 TFEU) 
residual legal base (used when a more specific provision was unavailable)—a unanimous 
decision of  all member states was required. Lightfoot38 reports that values compliance 
was a controversial element. He writes: “it was felt that [it] could lead to the removal of  
funding from a party because it was seen to lack respect for democratic values. . . . Both 
29 Proposal for a Council Regulation [on] [EuPP], COM(2000)898, February 13, 2001.
30 Id. at 2 (referring to Court of  Auditors Special Report 13/2000, OJ C 81, June 28, 2000). Cf. Lightfoot, 
supra note 11, at 305.
31 Proposal for a Council Regulation [on] [EuPP], supra note 29, at 3.
32 EP, Report on the [EuPP] proposal (rapporteur: Ursula Schleicher), A5-0167/2001, May 3, 2001, at 19 
(emphasis added).
33 Id. at 14 (amendment 21); OJ C34 E/254 of  February 7, 2002 (voting record), and the Consolidated ver-
sion of  the EP amendments to the Commission Proposal in OJ C34 E/341 of  February 7, 2002 (where it 
appeared as renumbered amendment 35 and article 5a).
34 Id.
35 EP, A5-0167/2001, May 3, 2001, at 10.
36 COM(2001) 343, amended proposal for a Council Regulation [on] [EuPP], June 21, 2001, at 2.
37 Id.
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the FPÖ in Austria and the Lega Nord in Italy were in coalition governments at the time 
and therefore represented at the Council. They felt this issue was an attack on them. 
Together with Denmark39 they ended up voting against the proposal.”
This outcome resulted in another frequently used EU solution: try again, but with a 
different procedure. With the inclusion of  Article 191(2) TEC (now Article 224 TFEU), 
the Nice Treaty moved to provide for a specific legal basis to regulate Europarties, cru-
cially removing the unanimity requirement.40 Upon its entry into force, the Commission 
immediately re-tabled its European Political Parties proposal41 for there to be rules in 
place for the 2004 European Parliament elections. Trying to navigate the last Parliament 
input42 and critical Council discussions, it repeated the insertion of  a values clause while 
clarifying that “it would be inappropriate to establish intrusive or over-prescriptive politi-
cal requirements for Europarty registration. . . .”43 In terms of  compliance control, the 
Commission retabled its proposal for a Committee of  Wise Men.44
The European Parliament sustained its support for values compliance45 but 
debated the modalities. It was focused on “not [appearing to] be involved in 
. . . a ‘licensing’ procedure [but it] should be empowered . . . to carry out ex-post ver-
ification.”46 Moreover, the Member of  European Parliament pushing the file (the so-
called rapporteur) favored a “neutral” body administering the funds and proposed 
that the Commission be in charge of  this and more generally take the initiative in 
triggering it.47 The Commission was unenthusiastic, presumably because it consid-
ered it too political a task for itself. It was not sustained in the text. Smaller right-
wing populist political groups in the European Parliament, such as the Union for 
Europe of  the Nations (UEN) and Europe of  democracies and diversities (EDD) voted 
against.48 In the Council the same member states remained opposed. But they were 
outvoted this time. Regulation 2004/200349 was a fact for the Europe of  fifteen.
As a sign that significant implications were expected from EU values verification, 
several outvoted independent and “populist” Members of  the European Parliament 
challenged the Regulation’s legality.50 They argued that Europarties funding rules dis-
criminated against smaller and minority political groups.51 Representation requirements 
39 The Danish government at that time relied on the support of  Dansk Folkeparti, the populist Danish 
People’s Party.
40 Its Declaration 11 related to article 191 and contained the following wording: “The provisions on the 
funding for political parties shall apply on the same basis to all the political forces represented in the EP.”
41 Proposal for a Regulation [on] [EuPP], COM(2003)77, February 19, 2003, at 2.
42 Cf. EP, Report on the [EuPP] proposal (rapporteur: Jo Leinen), A5-0170/2003, May 21, 2003, at 24.
43 COM(2003)77, supra note 41, at 2.
44 Id. at 6 (art. 4—verification).
45 EP, Report on the [EuPP] proposal (rapporteur: Jo Leinen), A5-0170/2003, May 21, 2003, at 25: “Of  course 
an [EuPP] receiving financial aid from the Union’s budget must respect” basic EU values (emphasis added).
46 Id. at 9 (amend. 8).
47 Id. at 11–12 (amend. 12). Cf. Lightfoot, supra note 11, at 307–308.
48 Lightfoot, supra note 11, at 307.
49 Regulation 2004/2003, OJ L 297/1, 15 November 2003.
50 Case T-13/04, Bonde and others v. EP and Council, action brought on January 15, 2004; Case T-17/04, 
Le Front National and Seven Others v. EP and Council; Case T-40/04, Emma Bonino and Others v. EP and 
Council, action brought on February 6, 2004.
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and unconditional value endorsement in their view violated freedom of  expression 
and association. Most ingeniously, they maintained that equal treatment and democ-
racy were put under pressure by treating politicians differently when not members of  a 
Europarty, including because in practice they might be in capable of  joining.52
Curiously, the European Court of  Justice rather formalistically dismissed their claims. 
It ruled that the claimants, even if  elected political representatives with an individual 
mandate, were “not directly and individually concerned”53 by the rules—its standard for-
mulation for analyzing who can challenge an EU legislative act.54 It did, however, clarify 
two matters. It implied, significantly, that, contrary to control of  other requirements for 
Europarty formation, the one relating to asserting compliance with values was not digital 
but a question of  gradation.55 Again taking a formal line, it also dismissed equal treat-
ment arguments, stressing that disadvantages of  not being part of  a European political 
party extended to Members of  the European Parliament irrespect ive of  political ideas.56
After so much discussion, there was a rather loud silence. A  first Regulation 
2004/2003 evaluation report did not even mention the values compliance mecha-
nism.57 In 2007 the Commission proposed changes.58 They left untouched values 
compliance and consisted principally of  including EPF in the scope and creating more 
financial flexibility once given funding. The Parliament and Council (by now consisting 
of  twenty-five member states) accepted the changes.59 Regulation 1524/2007,60 adapt-
ing Regulation 2004/2003, was therefore quickly adopted. A second Parliament evalu-
ation reported no penalties imposed on any Europarty or EPF in the period of  2007 to 
2011.61 The Regulation’s values verification provisions had remained a dead letter.
The Commission proposed revisions in September 2012.62 It made two highly sig-
nificant additions without explaining them in the explanatory memorandum. First, as 
to the scope of  the compliance obligation it suggested adding wording that to be con-
sidered a European political party, it must observe Article 2 TEU values in its program 
52 This argument was made by the claimants in T-40/04; OJ C 94/49, April 17, 2003.
53 Case T-13/04, July 11, 2005; Case T-17/04, July 11, 2005; Case T-40/04, July 11, 2005. Case T-17/04 was 
appealed, and then dismissed by the Court in C-338/05 P, Le Front National and Others, July 13, 2006.
54 For a critique of  the Court’s approach, including in the light of  the Article 2 TEU value of  democracy, 
see John Morijn, Judgment of  the General Court of  8 February 2018 in Case T-118/17, Institute for Direct 
Democracy in Europe/European Parliament, in annoTaTed Cases on The eU CharTer of fUndamenTal righTs 
2017–2018 (Aniel Pahladsingh ed., forthcoming 2019).
55 Case T-40/04, para. 52.
56 Case T-40/04, paras. 67–68.
57 EP, Report on [EuPP] (2005/2224(INI)) (rapporteur Jo Leinen), A6-0042/2006, February 27, 2006; 
European Parliament resolution on [EuPP] (2005/2224(INI)), P6_TA(2006)0114.
58 Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation 2004/2003, COM(2007)364, June 27, 2007.
59 EP, Draft report on [COM(2007)364] (rapporteur: Jo Leinen), 2007/0130(COD), July 24, 2007; EP, 
Report on [COM(2007)364] (rapporteur: Jo Leinen), A6-0412/2007, October 25, 2007; EP legislative 
resolution of  November 29, 2007 on [COM(2007)364], P6_TA(2007)0562.
60 Regulation 1524/2007 of  December 18, 2007, amending Regulation 2004/2003 on [EuPP], OJ L 
343/5, December 27, 2007.
61 EP resolution of  April 6, 2011, on [Regulation 2004/2003], P7_TA(2011)0143, point AB; the prepara-
tory report is EP, Report on the application of  Regulation 2004/2003 (rapporteur: Marietta Giannakou), 
A7-0062/2011, March 18, 2011.
62 Proposal for a Regulation [on] [EuPP] and [EPF], COM(2012)499, September 12, 2012.
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and its activities, and through those of  its members.63 Second, the Commission proposed 
a further widening in that “any natural or legal person may, at any moment, introduce a 
motivated request to the EP to verify compliance with . . . values.”64 Although available 
documentation does not entirely clarify this, the Parliament seems to have embraced 
neither of  these extensions.65
The real bottleneck in the negotiations appeared in the Council of  Ministers. A leg-
islative state of  affairs document produced eight months into the negotiations on the 
file described as a key concern “an appropriate balance between respect for standards 
of  governance and transparency . . . and the freedom of  association and the inde-
pendence of  European Political Parties and European Political Foundations. . . .”66 
The member state presiding over Council meetings was given mandate by the other 
member states to explore possible alternatives regarding the handling of  registration 
of  EuPP and EPF including values compliance.67 Discussions centred on “who and 
how” regarding decision-making relating to delisting in case of  a values breach.68 This 
led, in July 2013, to negotiations between the Commission, Parliament, and Council 
about setting up an independent authority for that purpose69—and to an agreement 
by December 2013.70
In September 2013, discussions revealed that most member states were in favor of  
limiting possibilities for delisting only in cases of  manifest and serious violations. A few 
wanted either a European Parliament’s or Council’s objection to a decision to deregis-
ter to suffice,71 but they did not get their way. Most significantly, by late January 2014 
the possibility to focus not only on a Europarty as a unit but also on its individual con-
stitutive member national parties had disappeared.72 In late February 2014 a final text 
was circulated for final approval by both co-legislators.73 The European Parliament 
agreed in April,74 the Council in September.75
64 Id. at 19 (art. 7(3)) (emphasis added).
65 EP, Report on [COM(2012)499] (rapporteur: Marietta Giannakou), A7-0140/2013, April 23, 2013. 
Curiously, regarding the first element (“and through those of  its members”) the text of  the Commission 
proposal is not reproduced correctly (at 15). Regarding the second element (natural or legal person 
should be able to trigger verification), the explanatory memorandum suggests this to be a good idea (at 
45) (“the rapporteur believes that this verification should be carried out annually or following a moti-
vated and duly justified request by any natural or legal person”) while the relevant amendment in fact 
deletes this Commission idea (at 23–25—amend. 45).
66 Council document 8106/13, April 5, 2013, at 4.
67 Council document 15725/13, November 8, 2013, at 2, point 4.
68 Id. at 2, point 5.
69 Id. at 2, point 6.
70 Council document 6457/14, February 14, 2014, p. 2, point 5.
71 Council document 15725/13, supra note 67, at 4, point 7.
72 Council document 5517/2/14 REV 2, January 29, 2014, at 4, para. 11.
73 Council document 7108/14, February 28, 2014.
74 Council document 9014/14, May 6, 2014.
75 Council document 14701/14, September 30, 2014. Two member states voted against, one abstained. 
The Netherlands was most principled in its objection. It stated its attachment to the independent position 
of  political parties, and that it should (only) be up to voters or judges to assess programs and activities of  
EuPP; Council document 13274/14 ADD1 REV2, September 24, 2014, at 1–2.
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Eventually the negotiations led to the following procedure. The Authority was set 
up with the task of  registering EuPP and EPF, and controlling and sanctioning them.76 
A standard form was developed to declare compliance with EU values at the registra-
tion phase.77 As it is specified that the Authority needs only ascertain that the form 
is filled in,78 this initial step is essentially one of  self-certification. The Authority can 
verify the compliance of  programs and actions with EU values.79 It needs to do so 
when instructed by the Commission, the Council, or the Parliament,80 when a mem-
ber state where the Europarty or EPF is officially seated notifies the Authority,81 or 
when the Authority itself  receives signals about problems with values compliance.82 
For a compliance check a Committee of  Independent Eminent Persons is to be asked 
for advice.83 The Authority next needs to decide whether to follow the Committee’s 
opinion and decide about deregistration.84 It can only do so in the event of  a “manifest 
and serious breach” of  values.85 This decision is to be communicated to the Council 
and Parliament, which can object to it only on grounds related to the compliance 
assessment.86 If  both object, deregistration is blocked.87
Regulation 2018/673, amending Regulation 1141/2014, brought further 
tweaks. The most important one was that general registration requirement for 
Europarties was tightened. Only member parties, and no longer individuals holding 
an elected mandate in a member state, could satisfy the requirement of  minimum 
European representation.88 Moreover, the national party could only be a mem-
ber of  one European political party.89 Both measures were put in place “to pre-
vent the same national party from artificially creating several European Political 
Parties with similar or identical tendencies.”90 Two further notable amendments 
were made. First, probably from the viewpoint of  better regulation, it was opted to 
spell out the full list of  values of  Article 2, first sentence TEU in the recitals too.91 
More strikingly, it was clarified that citizens can address a reasoned request to the 
Parliament to induce it to lodge a question for verification of  compliance with 
Article 2 TEU values with the Authority.92 No explanation of  this inclusion is given, 
suggesting it was seen as a technicality linking possibilities in the Regulation to a 
77 Article 8(2)(a) and Annex.
78 Article 9(3) Regulation. Copies of  these forms are available on the APPF website.
79 Articles 10(3) and 10(4) juncto Articles 3(2)(c) and 3(3)(c).
80 Article 10(3), first subparagraph.
81 Article 10(3), first subparagraph juncto Article 16(3) first and second subparagraphs, respectively.
82 Article 10(3), second subparagraph.
83 Article 10(3), second subparagraph, second sentence.
84 Article 10(3), fourth subparagraph.
85 Article 10(3), fifth subparagraph and Article 11(3), first subparagraph.
86 Article 10(4), second subparagraph.
87 Article 10(4), first subparagraph, last sentence.
88 Article 3(1)(b), first subparagraph—amended.
89 Article 3(1)(ba).
90 Regulation 2018/673, recital 4.
91 Recital 12. In this way it reflects the wording of  Article 3(1)(c) verbatim.
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broader right to petition the EP. The Regulation’s values compliance mechanism, 
and its development over time, is visualized in Table 2.
4. Operationalizing the Regulation’s values compliance 
mechanism and beyond
The values verification mechanism entered into force on January 1, 2017. The Authority 
is functioning and members of  the Committee were appointed.93 This section will ana-
lyze questions relating to operationalizing the Regulation following the logic of  Table 
2. First Section 4.1 addresses some general issues with regard to the scope and focus of  
the compliance check and the standard of  review. Second, Section 4.2 highlights chal-
lenges regarding the triggering of  the mechanism. Finally, Section 4.3 considers some 
topics relating to the compliance check itself.
4.1. Scope, focus, and standard of  review of  the mechanism
A first aspect has to do with the combined effect of  registration conditions. Recent tighter 
rules, clarifying that only national political parties can be a member of  just one Europarty, 
have led to the deregistration and a nonapproved registration of  two right-wing populist 
EuPP and their corresponding EPF94 (see Table 3). For other right-wing populist Europarties 
93 European Commission, European Political Parties: Committee of  Independent Eminent Persons Now 
Complete, July 26, 2017, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-17-2168_en.htm. 
The members are Meglena Kuneva, António Vitorino, Maria Emilia Casas, Carlo Casini, Rebecca Adler-
Nissen, and Christophe Möllers.
94 APPF, Press release: Implementation of  Regulation 2018/673 amending Regulation 1141/2014, 
September 27, 2018.
Table 3. Effects of  Regulation 1141/2014
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and their Foundation the bottleneck was the written pledge of  allegiance with Article 2 
TEU. If  registration means transparency, and transparency means an open subjection to 
EU values that one would want to actually reject or discuss politically, that for some seems a 
bridge too far. In this way the inclusion of  values language has had a chilling effect.
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Zooming in on the specifics of  the values verification mechanism after 
 registration, an initial question relates to which Article 2 TEU values to consider. 
At one level this appears easy: the Regulation only spells out those in the first sen-
tence.95 Yet there are strong arguments to consider all principles listed in Article 2 
TEU, which is referred to in Article 7 TEU, in general terms, as a package.96 This 
is important because, as was shown, illiberal political action in Europe can be 
equally in tension with EU values listed in the second sentence: pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and equality between women and 
men. In any event, as a matter of  consistency and coherence, there is no reason to 
operate a more limited normative scope when it comes to EU-level values compli-
ance than to the member state level. After all, the same actors are involved, albeit 
at different levels of  government.
As a result of  the discussions among member states in the Council, the standard 
of  review is that of  a “manifest and serious breach.” Interestingly, this language var-
ies from that in Article 7 TEU. Article 7(1) TEU speaks of  a “clear risk of  a serious 
breach.” Article 7(2) TEU mentions the existence of  a “serious and persistent breach.” 
This raises the issue of  whether the Regulation intended to lay down a different stan-
dard, and if  so, in what respect and why? Its text and drafting history do not help. 
Given the cumulative articulation we could, as a matter of  legal interpretation, con-
sider what “manifest” adds to “serious,” or how it was defined in opposition to (only) 
“risk.” Perhaps the thinking was that in order to avoid (European) (party) political 
pressure to trigger the mechanism not just any theoretically serious breach should 
be considered relevant. It should have manifested itself. But that is already covered by 
the notion that the compliance with the values is to relate to EuPP/EPF’s “programme 
and its activities.”97 It therefore seems a reasonable reading that manifest and serious 
could be considered similar to serious in Article 7(1) TEU, but that the breach should 
not be purely theoretical. It must have somehow materialized. It is not, in other words, 
a speculative assessment of  likely implication, but a review of  the seriousness of  what 
has already occurred.
There are additional reasons for this reading. In actual practice the focus will be 
on “actions.” If  the very intention of  registration was to get access to funding, it is 
unlikely that a EuPP or EPF will include language directly at odds with Article 2 TEU. 
Why self-incriminate at a stage of  self-certification? As we have seen, this will result 
in a decision not to register in the first place, vacating the possibility of  getting any EU 
funding. Moreover, in terms of  values verification, it will also be much easier to focus 
on acts rather than just words as this will provide more context to any assessment.
As to the focus, at first sight the story of  the drafting history points to a read-
ing that the Regulation intends for the compliance check to relate to a EuPP as a 
unit. The Commission, it will be recalled, initially proposed for this to extend to the 
actions of  the individual national political parties together making up a Europarty. 
95 Recital 12, Articles 3(1)(c) and 3(2)(c).
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98 As Kelemen, supra note 6, at 113, has insightfully observed: “[W]ith EU-level political parties . . . gaining 
greater power, incentives intensify for the leaders of  [EuPP] to protect national autocrats who deliver 
votes to their coalition at the EU level.”
99 Article 38, first subparagraph—adapted with Regulation 2018/673.
Why is this of  great practical significance? As was shown, “mainstream” EuPP 
also have illiberal members with a track record of  undermining Article 2 TEU. 
Therefore, limiting the assessment to a Europarty as a whole would function as a 
major restriction, de facto rendering many of  the most problematic actors in the 
European Parliament outside the Regulation’s reach. This reading would, from the 
perspective of  Article 2 TEU, result in an uneven mechanism given that it seems 
politically and institutionally tailored to be triggered against Europarties with 
(almost) exclusive illiberal membership. This potentiality would of  course have far-
reaching undesirable implications. It would lead to the conclusion that in its cur-
rent set-up the Regulation only offers a partial response to those parliamentary 
actors endangering Article 2 TEU. But it could have even wider and even further-
reaching consequences.
If  the tendency toward an en bloc approach were to materialize, it could, if  uncor-
rected, entrench rather than alleviate the European Parliament’s “populist” problem. 
It could lead to a perverse impetus for illiberal actors to “seek refuge” in a “main-
stream” EuPP.98 This is not as unlikely as one might hope as the current set-up sug-
gests interest on both sides. The requirement for both the establishment of  a Europarty 
and a European Parliament political group for membership to come from a quarter of  
member states plays an important role here. Particularly in smaller EuPP and political 
groups this criterion, designed to guarantee broad European representativeness and 
prevent political fragmentation in how the Parliament functions, can result in making 
“throwing out bad apples based on Article 2 TEU issues” very unattractive. It is polit-
ically costly when requirements to initiate cooperation are no longer fulfilled and the 
Europarty or political group ceases to exist.
This dilemma would of  course be solved if  individualized assessment of  Article 2 
TEU compliance for EuPP would be brought into practice after all. Arguably that is 
necessary for the reason that it is paramount to avoid tension with Article 7 TEU. 
If  the law allows addressing the fallout of  illiberal action in a specific member state 
based on Article 7 TEU, what could justify the Regulation disallowing this targeted 
approach at the EU level if  the very same national political party (now a component of  
a Europarty) is involved? This is simply a matter of  legal coherence and consistency: 
lower-level Union law (the Regulation) should be read in the light of  the treaty text 
itself  (Articles 2 and 7 TEU). If  this reasoning would not be accepted in practice, there 
is clearly a need for the EU legislator to reconsider this once the Regulation is evalu-
ated, scheduled for December 2021.99
In the meantime, in a self-sanitizing move, nothing prevents “mainstream” EuPP 
and European Parliament political groups to implement their own system of  EU values 
compliance checking, or rules on cooperation with other mainstream parties that de-
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power. Members of  the European Parliament could equally reconsider minimum geo-
graphical requirements for setting up political groups, making it less difficult to estab-
lish political groups. In balancing securing Article 2 TEU values with policy objectives 
of  EU-wide representativeness as well as preventing fragmentation within the 
European Parliament, the first simply needs to prevail. This non-legislative method of  
addressing the problem that “populism” poses, appears in many ways more targeted 
and suited to getting to the heart of  dealing with illiberalism within the Parliament.
4.2. Triggering of  the mechanism
The first interesting element is that next to Parliament itself  also the Council of  
Ministers (i.e. the member states) and Commission are now in a position to request the 
triggering of  the compliance test. The Parliament has formulated provisions for how 
to do this.100 For it to trigger the mechanism, one-quarter of  the component Members 
of  the European Parliament representing at least three political groups are needed.101 
This again likely means in practice that it is virtually ruled out that illiberal elements 
within mainstream political groups are targeted. Politically, they are more than likely 
to protect each other, even against each other’s “rogue elements” trying to fight for 
EU values. Yet, triggering is likely to happen when mainstream political groups, work-
ing together, want to target smaller ones composed (almost) exclusively of  illiberal 
actors.102 The situation for the Council of  Ministers is different. Here again the rel-
evance of  the close connection between national and EU-level political activity of  the 
same political party becomes evident. For one is hard pressed to think of  a scenario 
where the collection of  twenty-eight (soon twenty-seven) member states would want 
to trigger this mechanism vis-à-vis a Europarty which by definition is composed of  
member parties from at least one-quarter of  them.103
The Commission’s position is most interesting. Will it see this avenue as an addi-
tional tool for compliance with Article 2 TEU values at member state level? Could it 
be convinced to request the Authority to trigger the Regulation regarding the EuPP 
containing the ruling party or parties in a particular member state against which 
it intends to take action (e.g. through Article 7 TEU)? This has an evident political 
dimension as well. How likely is such Commission action against a Europarty con-
tained in political groups that has put forward the Commission president, or that oth-
erwise forms part of  the Parliamentary majority? The Commission did not take this 
route in its recent actions vis-à-vis Poland, even if  the Polish PiS ruling party (member 
of  the ECR political group) was not co-constitutive of  the parliamentary majority. But 
an instrument in the Commission’s hands with potential value for wider Article 2 TEU 
100 EP Rules of  Procedure, rule 223a.
101 Id., rule 223a(2).
102 In fact, it has happened in a procedure against the Alliance for Peace and Freedom EuPP. The EP 
Constitutional Affairs Committee (AFCO) conducted a hearing with representatives from the Alliance for 
Peace and Freedom (APF) on February 9, 2017. As shown above, the APPF has since removed this EuPP 
from the register.
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compliance induction it is. And perhaps one that could actually help the Commission 
politically in its rule of  law actions. Simultaneous EU- and member state-level action 
to react to the same facts would make for more consistent action that involves, and 
makes co-responsible, not only the member states through the Council but also the 
Parliament.
In a scenario of  a serious failure to fulfill relevant national legal obligations regard-
ing matters relating to elements affecting respect for EU values, member states where 
Europarties and EPF have their legal seat may address a request to the Authority for 
deregistration identifying in detail illegal actions and specific national requirements 
violated.104 Member states in which EuPP and their EPF do not have their seat but are 
nonetheless active have the same possibility. This raises two questions: what material 
scenarios could be relevant here? And what would lead a member state to use this 
possibility?
As to the first, one could think of  substantive additional national legal registration 
requirements for Europarties, such as a requirement for any parties active on the ter-
ritory to apply gender equality on their candidate lists such as in some Scandinavian 
member states. As to the second, it is once again hard to conceive of  a scenario where 
a member state would opt to wade into an EU-level highly political compliance check 
that would expose its national legislative specificities when it comes to handing politi-
cal parties. It seems likelier, if  this were ever considered for national political reasons 
that the member state would try to generalize the problem and frame it as something 
for the Council of  Ministers as a whole to trigger.
One of  the innovative aspects of  the 2012 Commission proposal was that individu-
als could also request to trigger the compliance check. This element did not initially 
survive in the 2014 negotiations. Yet this element has resurfaced with Regulation 
218/673. A  “group of  citizens” can submit a reasoned request to the European 
Parliament in accordance with its Rules of  Procedure.105 This could then lead the 
Parliament to send the Authority a request for verification of  compliance with Article 
2 TEU. This is evidently a potentially valuable way to put pressure on the Parliament 
to move to an assessment of  whether EuPP and their EPF act in accordance with the 
Regulation. In addition, the Authority itself  has a signaling possibility to the member 
states (Council), Commission, and Parliament where it becomes aware of  facts which 
may give rise to doubts as to compliance with EU values, so that the political institu-
tions can assess whether they want to lodge a verification. The relevant question is 
how the Authority could give hands and feet to this competence in practice in a way 
for that to have added value over competences and access to open source materials 
that the three mentioned EU institutions have themselves.
4.3. Verification of  compliance
Finally, the Regulation’s compliance check itself  raises several questions. When so 
requested by the Authority, the Committee is to give its opinion within two months.106 
104 Article 16(3).
105 Article 10(3), first subparagraph—amended by Regulation 218/673.
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As noted above, the European Court of  Justice, in one of  the few instances in which it 
has given substantive guidance in this area, has described the EU values-related regis-
tration condition as not a black-and-white matter but one of  judgment.107 That legal 
qualification seems to still hold true. However, in the Regulation (and unlike in Article 
7 TEU) there is some substantive guidance regarding the assessment to be made as 
well. Opinions are to give full consideration to freedom of  association and to the need 
to ensure pluralism of  political parties in Europe.108 This was included because dur-
ing the negotiations, some member states kept principled objections to values compli-
ance checks for political parties specifically, given their crucial place in the DNA of  the 
democratic process.
At one level, this instruction could be seen as simply a reaffirmation of  what is 
already inherent in any balanced Union law assessment: the whole of  Article 2 TEU, 
the EU Fundamental Rights Charter, and the rest of  the EU Treaties will need to 
serve as the broader interpretational context. Alternatively, this could be read as 
an instruction to interfere with actions by political parties as a last resort only, not 
just keeping de facto implications on political pluralism in the European Parliament 
in mind but putting them at the very forefront of  the compliance check. After all, 
at this stage we would be dealing with European political parties and foundations 
whose registration was initially cleared and that have therefore pledged their alle-
giance to Article 2 TEU.
The Authority will, upon receiving the Committee’s opinion about EU values com-
pliance in the case under consideration, need to decide whether or not to propose 
deregistering. This decision is to be duly reasoned. Given the resources available to 
the Authority and the fact that the facility to request external expertise implies the 
EU legislator’s preference for that route, it is unlikely to involve a (second) substantive 
assessment of  the facts or the law by the Authority itself. Yet, the Authority is inde-
pendent.109 Nothing could prevent it from doing so if  it decided to. Moreover, all of  its 
decisions are subject to European Court of  Justice review.110
The task of  the European Parliament and member states in the Council of  Ministers 
in assessing the Authority’s decision based on the Committee’s opinion would at this 
stage be highly charged. The fact that the Parliament and the Council would both 
need to agree to overturn a decision by the Authority to deregister a Europarty or 
EPF would make this step in the procedure at once more political but less likely to 
be politicized between the two EU institutions. Moreover, their separate or joint ob-
jection could be substantiated only on grounds related to the assessment with the 
conditions for registration.111 Where the Authority would arguably be unlikely to sec-
ond-guess what the Committee would put before it, it would at that stage perhaps 
be different for the European Parliament and Council. They could feel they needed 
107 Case T-40/04, para. 52.
108 Article 11(3), second subparagraph.
109 Article 6(2), first subparagraph, second sentence.
110 Article 6(11).








roningen user on 07 N
ovem
ber 2019
Responding to “populist” politics at EU level   639
a “second opinion” on the Committee’s opinion. After all, once again, the European 
Court of  Justice has itself  underlined that this is no black-and-white matter.
The question is: Who could provide a second opinion at that stage? And how much 
precious time would this add to the procedure again?112 These may seem mundane or 
purely academic questions. But if  anything they illustrate why proposals to add ever 
more institutions and instruments in the context of  EU values compliance, such as 
Müller’s,113 should be critically assessed. For even in a setting with many institutional 
actors, independent or not, the hot political potato does not just vanish. Theory of  
militant democracy is not exempt from practical realities of  institution-building, time 
constraints, and dealing with the issue yourself. In confronting the illiberal challenge 
at and from EU level, there is a real danger that focusing on ways to move around the 
potato distracts from considering the real issue: why does it remain so hot?114
In any event, the fact that in this Regulation (just as in the case of  Article 7 TEU) the 
EU legislator has opted to leave the final decision at the political level is itself  telling. 
This appears wise. Not only does it underline the legal, political, and democratic sig-
nificance of  (acting on) Article 2 TEU values, but—perhaps as important—it under-
scores that any defense of  EU values does not only necessitate an addressee. It also 
requires an identifiable subject accountable for the assessment and willingness to take 
political responsibility not only for the design of  the institutional set-up but also for 
the results it produces.
5. Conclusion
The story of  how the Regulation’s values compliance mechanism originated and 
developed, and the questions of  practice and principle raised by its operational-
ization, illustrates the complexities of  making progress in ensuring Article 2 TEU 
compliance. It is not quite the jewel of  better regulation. Without more it could 
remain a set-up that is inherently limited and limiting for confronting forces within 
the European Parliament whose agendas and actions are at odds with Article 2 
TEU. Yet, it also offers opportunities to the Commission and EU citizens. In addi-
tion to some evident changes the Parliament could implement itself, these could 
be explored to remedy some of  the Regulation’s shortcomings. In that way the 
Regulation’s values verification mechanism could yet develop into a useful tool 
to respond to politics at odds with Article 2 TEU values at EU level as well as the 
directly connected national level.
The story of  this Regulation more generally offers a rich account of  the EU leg-
islator considering options to refine Article 2 TEU compliance. It could serve as a 
112 For a convincing argument that the Commission’s Rule of  Law Framework has had the problematic effect 
of  actually delaying decisive EU action vis-à-vis member states, see Pech & Scheppele, supra note 6.
113 Müller, supra note 6, at 150: “to create an entirely new institution that could credibly act as a guardian of  
Europe’s acquis normative, [a] ‘Copenhagen Commission’—a body with a mandate to offer comprehen-
sive and consistent political judgments.”
114 For a similar viewpoint, see Petra Bárd & Dimitry Kochenov, Rule of  Law Crisis in the New Member States 
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stepping stone to rethink options for EU institutions in their effort to come to com-
prehensive, concerted, and decisive action to act upon their legal obligation to pro-
tect Union law principles. One particularly poignant lesson may be limitations to 
thinking along the lines of  creating ever more procedures and institutions. Hot po-
tatoes do not tend to get colder over time—only moving them on harbors the risk 
that they may actually start to rot too. Defending the EU’s basic values against pop-
ulist or other threats is therefore most definitely to be seen as a legal but certainly 
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